Bonding nature(s)? Funds, financiers and values at the impact investing edge in environmental conservation by Sullivan, S
 
 
Sullivan, S. (2018) 'Bonding nature(s)? Funds, financiers and 
values at the impact investing edge in environmental 
conservation’, in Bracking, S., Fredriksen, A., Sullivan, S. and 
Woodhouse, P., eds. Valuing development, environment and 
conservation: creating values that matter. Abingdon: 
Routledge, pp. 101-121. 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in ‘Valuing development, 
environment and conservation: creating values that matter’ on 07/11/2018 available online at:  
https://www.routledge.com/Valuing-Development-Environment-and-Conservation-Creating-Values-
that/Bracking-Fredriksen-Sian-Woodhouse/p/book/9781138080515  
 
ResearchSPAce 
http://researchspace.bathspa.ac.uk/ 
 
This pre-published version is made available in accordance with publisher policies.  
Please cite only the published version using the reference above. 
 
Your access and use of this document is based on your acceptance of the 
ResearchSPAce Metadata and Data Policies, as well as applicable law:-
https://researchspace.bathspa.ac.uk/policies.html  
Unless you accept the terms of these Policies in full, you do not have permission 
to download this document. 
This cover sheet may not be removed from the document. 
Please scroll down to view the document. 
1 
Part 2 
Conservation 
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Abstract This chapter highlights the value assumptions underscoring the recent and contested 
emergence of debt-based financing for the conservation of ‘standing natures’ in situ. In the 
aftermath of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) Paris climate agreement of late 2015, there has been a noticeable proliferation of 
policy publications and reports espousing the benefits of leveraging debt-based finance and 
impact investing for the conservation of so-called natural capitals. The chapter examines how 
new measures of the health and improvement of natures in situ are becoming a focus for 
financial concerns in ‘impact investing’. It introduces the concept and practice of impact 
investing and traces developments in the field of impact investing for the conservation, 
restoration and rehabilitation of terrestrial ecosystems. The chapter explores the innovations 
we are seeing today that seek to create conserved natures in situ as an asset class for impact 
investing, and sets them within a broader turn towards impact investing in social and 
development contexts. In doing so the chapter identifies the value-making mechanisms 
proposed and in place for translating projected natural capital quantities into financially 
leverageable forms of value. 
Introduction 
The bond market is the great innovation that distinguishes western capitalism from 
previous economic systems. (Climate Bonds Initiative 2010: 1) 
A key element of the work of the Leverhulme Centre for the Study of Value has been to 
document and analyse the many different ways through which concepts and indicators of 
nature health and harm are becoming economised and capitalised. This exploration of the 
performance of economic value for units of nature health and harm in situ has drawn 
attention to the discursive, numerical-economic, material and institutional dimensions and 
consolidations through which new economic values for nature are articulated. 
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‘Articulation’ here is understood in two senses: as speech act utterances that shape discursive 
reality as understood amongst those participating in relevant speech communities (Austin 
1962); and as acts of ‘joining’ and connection between people, organisations and practices 
associated with the qualification, quantification and materialisation of nature-as-natural-
capital (MacDonald and Corson 2012; Corson et al. 2013; MacDonald 2013; Sullivan 2013a, 
2014, forthcoming; Wilshusen and MacDonald 2017). 
Our research has focused on the following cases and issues: analysis of planning negotiations 
and policy proposals for biodiversity offsetting at connected sites of nuclear power production 
(UK) and uranium extraction (Namibia) (Sullivan 2013b); the application and adjustment of 
technical calculative devices for the quantification of biodiversity value at sites of damage 
and conservation in biodiversity offsetting in England (Carver 2015; Carver and Sullivan 
2017, Chapter 7 this volume; Sullivan and Hannis 2017); value struggles arising over 
biodiversity offsetting as a new conservation technology for mitigating harms caused by 
development (Sullivan and Hannis 2015); development of new balance sheet accounting 
practices for bringing nature as ‘natural capital’ into national and corporate annual accounts 
(Sullivan and Hannis 2017); and the ontological dimensions and politics infusing the 
controversial revisioning and making of ‘nature’ as ‘natural capital’ (Sullivan 2014, 2017a, 
2017b, forthcoming; Sullivan and Hannis 2017). These analyses have drawn attention to the 
multiplicitous ways in which value(s) for nature(s) are fabricated rather than found (Sullivan 
2017c, forthcoming). As such, they align with broader approaches in economic sociology that 
assert performative dimensions of numerical-economic devices and counting practices as they 
are applied to the calculation and valuation of environmental healths and harms (for example, 
Fourcade 2011; Ehrenstein and Muniesa 2013; Lippert 2014; Lohmann 2014). 
Drawing on review of grey literature sources, as well as attendance and participation in a 
series of environmental policy events in recent years (listed in Sullivan forthcoming), in this 
chapter I focus on new ways in which measures of the health and improvement of natures in 
situ are becoming a focus for financial concerns in ‘impact investing’. Echoing notions of 
‘standing forests’, in which forests tend to be viewed in terms of economic values waiting to 
be articulated and then captured through harvest of the timber embodied in the trees that are 
‘standing’ (as documented and critiqued in Scott 1998), I use the term ‘standing natures’ to 
invoke a view of natures in situ being similarly approached as sources of new economic value 
that are poised for potential capitalisation and marketisation. This is a speculative form of 
value realisation based on assumed correspondences between natures standing now, current 
marketable prices and assumptions regarding likely future scenarios that can be economised 
and capitalised. In particular, I want to set innovations we are seeing today that seek to create 
conserved natures in situ as an asset class for impact investing within a broader turn towards 
impact investing in social and development contexts. In doing so, I provide some illustrations 
of how conserved and restored natures in situ are becoming part of the bond market identified 
in the epigraph above as the great innovation distinguishing western capitalism from previous 
economic systems. In the next section I introduce the concept and practice of impact 
investing. I then trace some developments in the field of impact investing for the 
conservation, restoration and rehabilitation of terrestrial ecosystems.  
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What is impact investing? 
Broadly speaking, impact investing (II) is a form of financing inspired by venture capitalism 
that promises a dual return on investment: returns on investment are calculated in terms of 
both profit and positive social, and increasingly environmental, impacts – hence impact 
investing (Chiapello and Godefroy 2017: 152). In II, the aim is to blur the boundary between 
philanthropic gift-giving and financial returns. Impact investing is framed increasingly as 
desirable as an ‘innovative’ source of financing for social, development and environmental 
concerns normally funded through public spending because of declines in public funding, 
especially in the wake of the 2007–2008 financial crisis.  
So-called ‘Innovative Financing Mechanisms’ (IFMs) are financial products and instruments 
that tap into funds and partners beyond commitments from conventional donors and bonds 
from traditional international financial institutions (Douste-Blazy 2009; Ketkar and Ratha 
2009; Hurley 2012; OECD 2013). Declines in public finance associated in part with 
neoliberal transfers of power and assets to the private sector, coupled with crisis in multiple 
spheres of socio-economic and environmental life, are giving rise to a perceived need to 
unlock, i.e. to release or mobilise, funds from a buoyant private sector to finance initiatives 
associated in the post-World War 2 period with the public sector, at least in the industrialised 
north. Innovative Financing Mechanisms, including II, are thus being designed as financial 
instruments that will ‘unlock’ private sector funds. The imperative to ‘unlock’ these funds is 
in order to ‘scale up’ financial resources for social, development and environmental arenas 
that, especially in the post-World War 2 period, have been considered the responsibility of the 
public sector. This scaling-up of private sector resources is considered necessary so as to fill 
the ‘funding gap’ arising as public coffers have been emptied through combinations of asset 
transfers, bailouts, austerity regimes and declines in tax revenue. All of these phenomena are 
linked to the propensity for crisis that even economists of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) – one of the primary institutional architects of a global neoliberal regime1 – now affirm 
are amplified by neoliberal policies (Ostry et al. 2016). Indeed, ‘funding gap’, ‘unlock’ and 
‘scaling-up’ are terms frequently used in promotional, advocacy and technical documentation 
regarding II as a source of ‘innovative finance’ for social, development and environmental 
investments (for example, WWF et al. 2011; OECD 2013; Centre for Public Impact 2017: 1; 
Environmental Finance 2017).  
Given the current plutonomic concentration of financial assets in the wealth of (ultra) high net 
worth individuals ((U)HNWIs) and large investors such as pension funds (Kapur et al. 2005; 
OXFAM 2016), finance for social, development and environmental concerns is increasingly 
being sought from these private sources (Mawdsley 2015). Private sector funds, designed to 
be complementary to and interwoven with more conventional aid and public spending 
commitments, are thus a focus of urgent calls for a shift in global investment patterns to 
generate new funds for connected endeavours in social development, the conservation of 
terrestrial ecosystems, carbon/climate management, and infrastructure development, including 
renewable energy. New financial products designed so as to source private finance for a 
spectrum of interconnected global challenges include: social impact bonds (Centre for Public 
Impact 2017; discussion in Harvie in press); green development and climate bonds2; and, 
increasingly, a variety of impact investments linked with conservation outcomes in terrestrial 
ecosystems or ‘standing natures’ (Credit Suisse et al. 2014; Huwyler et al. 2014; Credit Suisse 
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and McKinsey Center for Business and Environment 2016; Credit Suisse et al. 2016). These 
financial instruments are designed to appeal to desires amongst the wealthy of society to ‘do 
good’ in an entrepreneurial spirit, and are thus also referred to as enabling ‘venture 
philanthropy’3 and/or ‘impact entrepreneurship’ (Social Impact Investment Taskforce 2014). 
Impact investing constitutes a particular strand in an array of so-called IFMs for social, 
development and environmental agendas. As depicted in Figure 6.1, II sits between 
conventional finance-first investment and pure grant- or gift-giving. Chiapello and Godefroy 
(2017: 153) describe II as involving an adaptation of financial investors’ practices to social 
and now environmental sectors, creation of a new type of investment fund, i.e. an impact 
investment fund, and a redefining of the existing funding practices of social and/or 
environmental organisations such that they become oriented towards and entangled with 
financial asset management structures. The II market is construed and constructed as a 
concerned market whose performance is measured on the basis of a double return in terms of 
value: ‘a financial one for the investors and a social [and/or environmental] one for the public 
interest’ (Chiapello and Godefroy 2017: 158). As a form of ‘payment-by-results (PbR)’ 
financing, II brings together socially and environmentally motivated private finance 
organisations with social and environmental providers, such that previously public services 
become outsourced both to private sources of finance and to private sources of provision, 
albeit usually with some form of publicly funded incentive or subsidy (Centre for Public 
Impact 2017: 1). Hailed as a revolutionary ‘paradigm shift in capital market thinking’ that 
uses private finance to leverage the value of public expenditure, II is framed by proponents as 
the invisible heart of capital markets: as a force capable of harnessing ‘entrepreneurship, 
innovation and capital to power social [and environmental] improvement’ (Social Impact 
Investment Taskforce 2014: 1).
Figure 6.1 The impact investing spectrum 
Source: Adapted from the European Venture Philanthropy Association (see 
http://evpa.eu.com/about-us/what-is-venture-philanthropy, accessed 25 July 2017). Also see Social 
Impact Investment Taskforce (2014: 19) and Chiapello and Godefroy (2017: 164).  
5 
Importantly, the II market is based on promises that bind in two main ways: investment 
becomes bound with the promise of positive and measurable social and/or environmental 
impact; simultaneously, the social and or environmental asset to be enhanced through 
investment becomes bound to the investment and its promise of profit to investors.  
We can see this binding more clearly by looking at examples of how the II market is starting 
to play out in practice in the social development arena. The UK, for example, has seen an 
expansion of investment in social development under the rubric of ‘Social investment’ and 
‘Social Impact Bonds’ or ‘SIBs’. This expansion has been guided by a Social Impact 
Investment Taskforce set up by the G8 and led by a co-founder of the first venture capital 
fund set up in Europe in 1972 (Social Impact Investment Taskforce 2014; Chiapello and 
Godefroy 2017: 162). Whilst chairing the G8’s Social Impact Investment Taskforce, which 
oversees more than half of the 30-plus SIBs currently in operation in the UK, this individual 
was simultaneously the chair of a social impact investment fund called Big Society Capital,4 
set up to finance social investments (Harvie forthcoming). The UK government under the 
former Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition has been instrumental in supporting 
policies that will grow the II market, producing a number of policy papers between 2011 and 
20145 (for example, HM Government 2014). Since the first SIB was established in the UK in 
2010, the UK now hosts the largest number (n = 32) of SIBs financing and providing social 
services, of a total global market in SIBs of around n = 61 (Centre for Public Impact 2017: 2). 
SIBs currently constitute only a very small proportion of total public service expenditure in 
the contexts specified. Nonetheless, II is considered indicative of ‘a wider shift in the way 
public services are funded and delivered’, especially in the developed world (Centre for 
Public Impact 2017: 3), with II models – specifically Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) – 
also being extended as financing structures for development aid spending (Centre for Global 
Development and Social Finance 2013).  
To clarify how an SIB works, let us take an example of one UK SIB summarised in a paper 
by economist David Harvie (in press, and references therein) who writes that:  
The Essex SIB, launched in April 2013, was the first SIB commissioned by a local 
authority, Essex County Council. The bond funds a £3.1 million scheme to ‘help 380 
vulnerable 11–16 year olds on the edge of care or custody to stay safely at home with 
their families’, using an intervention called Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST), provided by 
children’s charity Action for Children. Investors include Big Society Capital [see above] 
and Bridges Ventures, with their £3.1m investment channelled via a special purpose 
[outsourced] vehicle Children’s Support Services Ltd. The key outcomes metric is ‘the 
saving in aggregate care placement days for each MST cohort, benchmarked against a 
historical comparison group’. The project will operate for five years, with outcomes 
payments, which will be capped at £7m extending into the eighth year. According to the 
[government-run] Centre for Social Impact Bonds6, ‘[t]he SIB could see investors earn 8–
12% annual interest on their investment’, while the total saving to Essex County Council 
(net of outcome payments) could be £10.3million over the project’s timeframe. 
As this example clarifies, this ‘financialization of the social’ (Chiapello and Godefroy 2017: 
153) is described as generating multiple wins: social impact is achieved, investors 
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receive returns and government saves on expenditure. In addition, a secondary market seems 
to be emerging in connection with social II in the form of a ‘social impact exchange’,7 
described as ‘the world’s first regulated exchange dedicated to businesses and investors 
seeking to achieve a positive social and environmental impact through their activities’. 
This broader review of II in the SIB market indicates several iterative features: 
1) a funding gap is identified requiring the ‘scaling-up’ of resources from the 
private sector;  
2) work begins and becomes continuous to design and create new investment products
that will attract private sources of investment and, particularly, to assert and stabilise
new categories and boundaries that create new asset classes that can attract returns-
seeking investment. Through this work, new asset classes of public social
development domains are identified and stabilised through combinations of
professional investment and risk management skills and the design and application of
standardised metrics, benchmarks, ratings, devices, etc. for the assessment,
classification, categorisation and valuation of both financial and social impact returns
(Chiapello and Walter 2016; Chiapello and Godefroy 2017). These activities are
coupled with the significance of stabilised value judgements ‘used to value not only
products that are being exchanged, but also the actors that produce them’ (Chiapello
and Godefroy 2017: 157), contributing both to consolidations of epistemic
communities around II and to the stabilising of criteria on which to base costs and
prices. Linked with the bringing forth of new asset classes, and the instituting of new
accounting and audit practices for both asset and impact valuation, is the emergence
and consolidation of a new cadre of intermediaries offering specialist services in
accounting, impact measurement, brokerage and fund management;
3) seed financing is frequently offered to stimulate the design and stabilising of new II
pathways to ‘build a marketplace’ and ‘unlock capital’ (Chiapello and Godefroy 2017:
161). For example, in 2008, the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation
approved $38 million in support of an Impact Investing Initiative in the US for the
period 2008–2011, and this is one amongst many such examples of initial funding
commitments pledged to develop a market in II (discussed further below);
4) impact investing is made attractive through government support and subsidies,
especially through the transfer of public funds, tax breaks and guarantees (Centre for
Public Impact 2017: 14–15) coupled with competition amongst private investors for
these sources of public financing. In addition, the state establishes the economic and
policy context for social II by setting up appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks,
and creating key supporting institutions.
The reason for going into the social II model in some detail is to clarify that models for II 
already exist that are now being transferred to and (re)designed for environmental concerns. 
This chapter thereby illustrates how calculative and valuation devices can be standardised in 
one value domain, and then circulated and applied to others, presumably with potential for 
commensurabilities between different social and environmental outcomes to also become 
possible. In the following section I turn to the II edge for valuing, conserving, restoring and 
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rehabilitating ‘standing natures’.  
The Impact Investing Edge in Conservation Finance 
We strongly believe that natural capital is the next frontier of impact investment 
and both specialist skills and a critical size are required to successfully address 
this nascent but promising market. (Philippe Zaouati, CEO of Mirova 
Responsible Investing, quoted in Natixis, Mirova and Althelia Ecosphere 2017: 2) 
Echoing the circumstances described above, a significant funding gap is considered to 
characterise environmental conservation, restoration and rehabilitation, requiring filling 
through IFMs, including II. Aichi Target 20, agreed in 2010 by the Conference of Parties of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, thus focuses on the need to scale up financial 
resources for the conservation of biodiversity,8 and an Annexe to the COP’s Strategic Plan for 
Biodiversity in 2011–2020 speaks of the possibility for IFMs to help fill this gap.9 Assertions 
of the need to scale up financial provision in the environmental arena have been accompanied 
by growth in proposals for how to unlock new sources of private finance so as to support 
investments in the conservation, restoration and rehabilitation of 
‘standing natures’, particularly in tropical contexts in the ‘global south’. Simultaneously, a 
number of new financing facilities have appeared to support ‘conservation enterprise’ via II 
for conservation: see, for example, Rewilding Europe Capital10 and Conservation Capital,11 
the latter of which has a specific emphasis on Conservation Impact Investment12 and also 
partners with African conservation projects through African Wildlife Capital.13 Similarly, the 
ENGO The Nature Conservancy (TNC), for example, now sells ‘Conservation Notes’ for a 
minimum investment of $25,000 over 1, 3 or 5 years, with dual return of interest rates up to 2 
per cent (depending on term selected) and environmental returns measured annually in ‘acres 
protected, landscapes preserved, and habitat restored’ (TNC 2017: online).  
In what follows I document and review some moments in the emergence of proposals for II to 
support the conservation of standing natures in situ. My aim is to show how this II edge is 
opening and taking hold in the environmental conservation arena, some of the organisations 
and consolidating collaborations involved, and some of the value-framings being mobilised so 
as to generate both financial and conservation impacts through instruments becoming 
operational at this edge.  
A pertinent starting point occurs in 2011. In this year a collaboration between the global 
ENGO the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Global Canopy Programme, the Climate 
Bonds Initiative and the banking/investment firms Goldman Sachs and Lombard Odier 
consolidated proposals for the development of ‘Forest Bonds’ to finance what they call 
‘ecological infrastructure such as tropical forests’ (Kanak et al. 2011: 5). As occurs with II for 
social development, this collaboration proposed that public sector funds and incentives such 
as tax breaks be used to support private sector investment in forests, in return for government 
issued bonds based in part on the monetary value that could be mobilised from the ‘natural 
capital’ of tropical forests (WWF et al. 2011). The advice of these organisations was that ‘the 
investment proposition needs to be large and liquid to attract the largest investors’, and that 
multilateral donors might ‘play an additional catalytic role by issuing a forest bond 
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themselves and helping to pump-prime the forest bond market’ (WWF et al. 2011: 5). The 
income for repaying the investment was proposed to derive from new sources of forest carbon 
revenue, generated, for example, through the United Nations REDD+ programme14 (which 
received new support through the Paris Climate Agreement in 201515), ecosystem service 
markets, sustainable timber and agriculture and taxes, all of which would arise as outcomes of 
the positive and measurable impacts effected through proposed private sector investments 
(WWF et al. 2011).  
To take one source of projected value from standing natures mentioned here, forest carbon 
revenue is a reference to the ‘future streams of payments for expected emissions reductions’ 
(World Bank Group 2012: 1) provided by the carbon contained in standing forests that are 
projected to be ‘unlocked’ under REDD+. The REDD+ programme encourages forests of the 
global south deemed to be under sustainable forest management and involving the 
conservation and enhancement of carbon stocks beyond a counterfactual scenario of forest 
degradation to become tradable in global emissions offsets markets. This process involves 
various (and contested) practices of quantification, calculation and monetisation, relating in 
particular to both documenting the quantity of carbon stored in trees left standing and the 
counterfactual calculation of carbon that would otherwise be lost without a REDD+ scheme in 
place (for details see especially Lohmann 2009, 2014; Ehrenstein and Muniesa 2013; 
Asiyanbi 2017).  
In parallel, over the last few years new investment funds have been established to raise capital 
to invest in emerging markets associated with environmental conservation efforts. The 
Althelia Climate Fund (ACF) is prominent amongst these new II funds focusing on 
environmental conservation parameters. Althelia Climate Fund is a Specialised Investment 
Fund based in Luxembourg, established and managed by asset management platform Althelia 
Ecosphere – ‘an impact investment manager that delivers financial returns that are fully 
aligned with the conservation of nature and sustainable social development’16 – and supported 
by ENGO Conservation International (Kill 2016). Althelia Ecosphere invests ‘in activities 
with the objective of providing net-positive impacts for their communities and ecosystems’.17 
Performance is measured according to a seven-pointed star of categorised ‘impact themes’, 
namely ‘climate’, ‘ecosystems’, ‘species’, ‘livelihoods’, ‘inclusivity’, ‘sustainable enterprise’ 
and ‘fair economic returns’, framed specifically in connection with the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) (Althelia Ecosphere 2016, 2017 – access to the full impact data 
tables is protected, requiring an investor login to the Althelia Ecosphere website). Kill (2016: 
9) reports that the administrative agent and custodian bank of ACF is BNP Paribas Securities
and Services, and the two major founding shareholders of the Althelia Climate Fund (as well
as the major shareholders of the entity that holds a third General Partner share in ACF)
previously held positions as head of Carbon Finance and Director of Environment and
Forestry for BNP Paribas Corporate and Investment Banking.
In 2013 ACF was described as comprising ‘a diversified portfolio of investments in Africa, 
Latin America and Asia that take the form of real assets (certified commodities and 
agricultural produce) and environmental services (verified emissions reductions and other 
ecosystem services)’ that will deliver ‘cash dividends to investors’ (Althelia Ecosphere 2013: 
1). At the outset the fund proclaimed an interest in potential flows of both conservation and 
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financial value arising in particular through REDD+ and Payments for Ecosystem Services 
(PES) markets (Abusaid 2011). Its intention has been to create ‘new environmental assets that 
reflect the value of natural capital’,18 with ‘[e]cosystem goods and services from Natural 
Capital’ proclaimed as ‘worth trillions of US dollars per year’ (Althelia Ecosphere 2013: 3). 
Initial seed investments in the ACF from the public financial institution the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) amongst other investors totalled €101 million in June 2014 (Kill 
2016: 2), asserted as fully invested by 2017 (Althelia Ecosphere 2017). The fund was 
enhanced with more than $130 million lent from the USAID in 2014,19 assisting with 
guaranteeing prices to investors financing Althelia’s global portfolio of investments (Kill 
2016: 8). Althelia Climate Fund was paid some €4.40 million in 2014–2015 in management 
fees charged as a proportion of investment (Kill 2016: 4). Figure 6.2 illustrates the II 
institutional structure and entanglements consolidating around ACF and connected 
organisations.  
A core project in Althelia’s portfolio is the Kenyan Kasigau Corridor REDD+ Project 
(KCRD)20 with recent expansions into the neighbouring ‘Taita Hills Conservation and 
Sustainable Land Use Project’. Here, Althelia has collaborated with the US-based company 
Wildlife Works Carbon LLC to commit funds that invest in REDD+ and that repay investors 
through income arising from the sale of carbon credits from woodlands conserved and 
rehabilitated through the Kasigau–Taita projects. This II initiative has recently received new 
impetus through the release in 2016 of the first Forest Bond designed to pay its investors with 
both cash and/or carbon credits. Issued by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the 
World Bank and developed with mining conglomerate BHP Billiton and Conservation 
International, this ‘[i]nnovative $152 million bond to protect forests and deepen carbon-credit 
markets’ (Klopfer and Panajyan 2016: online) represents an important first linking between 
two accounting nodes of green finance architecture: the green bond market and the carbon-
accounted offset market. In this case carbon credits are purchased from the REDD+ and 
conservation scheme in Kenya’s Kasigau Corridor, operated by the private sector company 
Wildlife Works LLC and amongst the portfolio of investments brokered by Althelia Climate 
Fund. Repayments in certified carbon credits can be used either to offset corporate carbon 
emissions or sold on carbon markets (Klopfer and Panajyan 2016: online). The 5-year bond is 
designed to scale up private sector climate change finance and conservation liquidity, but 
nonetheless exists in a context of concern regarding local socio-economic impacts of Kasigau 
offset provision (Chomba et al. 2016; Kill 2016). The bond has been sold to major global 
institutional investors, including the pension funds California State Teachers’ Retirement 
System (CalSTRS) and Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America (TIAA), the 
impact investment fund Treehouse Investments LLC and the insurance company QBE 
(Klopfer and Panajyan 2016: online). As well as preventing deforestation, proceeds from the 
bond are intended to support private sector development and particularly IFC’s private sector 
lending in emerging environmental markets (Klopfer and Panajyan 2016: online). 
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Figure 6.2 Impact investment organisational structure emerging around Althelia Climate Fund and associated organisations 
Source: Derived from information reported in Kill (2016), Klopfer and Panajyan (2016), Cobley (2017: online) and https://althelia.com/ (accessed 27 July 
2017). 
Notes. The Funds and intermediaries are shaded, and specific financial products are indicated with a dashed border.
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Forest Bonds are also being established that focus specifically on Indonesian forests. In April 
2015, ADM Capital,22 an investment manager seeking long-term capital appreciation through 
opportunities in Asia and Eastern Europe, collaborated with the ENGO Flora and Fauna 
International,23 to launch a $1 billion bond programme in ‘Rainforest Impact Bonds’ as a 
finance mechanism for tropical forest conservation that stimulates green economic growth 
(ADM Capital 2015). This initiative has recently been boosted by a new grant to support the 
design of a Tropical Landscapes Finance Facility (TLFF) and Tropical Landscapes Bond 
(TLB), developed in partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
the International Center for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF) and (again) the bank BNP 
Paribas (Genasci 2017). As described above, these bond structures are designed in connection 
with sovereign aid commitments from developed countries to stem global climate change by 
reducing forest carbon emissions through deforestation and habitat degradation. The flow of 
repayments to investors in Rainforest Impact Bonds is thus projected to derive from newly 
commodified and marketable carbon values in tropical forests whose value has been made 
legible in part via sovereign aid commitments derived from public monies.  
These forest and rainforest bonds as instruments for supporting II in the conservation of 
standing natures are themselves part and parcel of proliferating proposals for the scaling-up of 
conservation investments from institutional investors and (ultra) high net worth individuals 
((U)HNWIs), i.e. the super-super-rich, through financial products linked with emerging or 
predicted conservation markets (Huwyler et al. 2014: online; also Credit Suisse et al. 2014; 
Credit Suisse and McKinsey Center for Business and Environment 2016). In these new 
impact-related conservation finance structures, investor risk is projected to be reduced 
through mobilising such newly eligible-leverageable assets and the ‘land or usage rights’ 
from which they derive as underlying collateral (see, for example, Credit Suisse and 
McKinsey Centre for Business and Environment 2016: 17). Credit Suisse is emerging as a 
key financial institution in mobilising debt-based conservation finance, having also worked 
with Althelia Ecosphere (see above) to sell ‘Conservation Notes’ in 2015,24 raising $14 
million from around 50 HNWI investors for conservation projects invested in via Althelia 
Climate Fund’s portfolio (Kill 2016: 7). Credit Suisse envisage and propose the matching of 
portfolios of conservation projects with a portfolio of investments, as shown in Figure 6.3, a 
structure that makes it increasingly hard to link any particular investment with any particular 
conservation project or outcome. 
The above examples focus on preventing the degradation of high-value ‘standing natures’. A 
different but related emerging aspect of II for conservation focuses on financing structures for 
the rehabilitation of land considered degraded. Once again, ‘large amounts of financial 
resources’ are asserted as required to fill the funding gap understood as a barrier to meeting 
the UN SDG target (15.3) of ‘a land degradation neutral world’ by 2030, and are envisaged to 
be provided by ‘[n]ew financial instruments and intermediaries, as well as enabling 
conditions, … to catalyze private capital around SDG implementation’.25 One response to this 
nexus of constraints and possibilities, and as outlined by the UN Convention to Combat 
Desertification (UNCCD), is the establishment of an independent Impact Investment Fund for 
Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN), expected to be launched in 2017 as ‘a first-of-its-kind 
investment vehicle leveraging public money to raise private capital for sustainable land 
management and land restoration projects worldwide’.26 
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Figure 6.3 Schematic representation of impact investing finance for environmental and social 
impacts.  
Source: Drawing on Credit Suisse, WWF and McKinsey&Company (2014: 11), ADM Capital (2015) 
and Credit Suisse and McKinsey Center for Business and Environment (2016: 9). 
Echoing the structures outlined above, the LDN Fund will be designed and managed by 
Mirova, a ‘responsible investment’ affiliate of French investment company Natixis Asset 
Management29 managing ‘nearly €7bn in green equity, bond, impact and infrastructure 
funds’, and seeking to raise €1 billion for the LDN Fund (Cobley 2017: online). Private 
finance is to be complemented by seed finance and support from public financial institutions 
including the EIB.30 This means that ‘state backers [will] make up around 30% of the fund’s 
investor base, under an arrangement that would see them take the first hit if any investments 
go sour’ thereby lowering ‘risk for private-sector investors like pension funds, … the idea 
being that private investors would benefit from returns of around 8% a year’ (Cobley 2017: 
online). In a bid to become ‘the European leader in natural capital investing’ (Natixis et al. 
2017: 1), Mirova, under contract with UNCCD, is negotiating a majority equity interest in 
Althelia Ecosphere (see above), through which it will seek to build and manage the LDN 
Fund as ‘a public–private investment fund to regenerate and manage farmland around the 
world – at a profit’ (Cobley 2017: online). The LDN Fund is described as ‘being structured as 
a layered fund, designed as a public–private partnership for blended finance’ to ‘complement 
and scale up existing financial instruments and funds for sustainable land management and 
rehabilitation by providing financing that would not otherwise be available in the market’.31 
These developments are thereby reframing and approaching land considered degraded as a 
new asset class suitable for investment (WBCSD 2015).  
To summarise, the examples outlined in this section repeat and consolidate the II structures 
considered in the previous section. They take shape in contexts of oft-stated concerns 
regarding the gaps in available finance for public expenditures. Reflecting broader interest in 
financial instruments that ‘blend’ public and private provision they frequently draw on seed 
funding and other guarantees from public financial institutions and are supported by enabling 
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regulatory and policy structures. They involve the vesting of skills, control and fees in 
intermediaries located in finance, thereby entangling solutions for environmental concerns 
with expertise in financial asset creation and management. In the following concluding 
section I consider some structural implications of this II edge in financing the conservation, 
restoration and rehabilitation of standing natures.  
Conclusion: ‘You know what I mean by a bond? Something that binds’32 
Institutional investors are actually very good at coming to terms with new sectors and 
making investments. But the thing that drives them to do that is returns. If there is a way 
things can be structured to get higher returns, the market will work really well. (Rupesh 
Madlani, CEO Global Sustainable Capital Management, in Environmental Finance 2017: 
online) 
Put together, these resources would provide the strategic vision for growth, strong 
investment processes, and support functions needed to scale up this natural capital investing 
business. (Natixis, Mirova and Althelia Ecosphere 2017: 1) 
The proposals outlined above for binding standing natures with financial domains through II 
aim to transform the supply of private capital to social, development and ecological enterprise 
with measurable impact, i.e. that better evidences the value (for money) that has been created. 
They require the creation of new asset classes of conserved, restored and rehabilitated 
‘standing natures’ that can attract or ‘unlock’ new sources of private capital investment so as 
to fill identified funding gaps in possibilities for social and environmental improvement. This, 
then, is a financing approach in which the qualification of ‘standing natures’ as ‘natural 
capital’ in situ, coupled with quantification through (ac)counting and valuation technologies, 
is permitting translations of projected natural capital quantities into financially material, i.e. 
leverageable, forms of value.  
Impact investing for the conservation, restoration and rehabilitation of standing natures is a 
new edge in the world of conservation finance. It is too early to say exactly what social, 
economic and material effects these innovations will manifest, or how much money will flow, 
to where and to whom. Some commentators have asserted the nascent, halting and faltering 
nature of this new investment field (for example, Dempsey and Suarez 2016; Dempsey 2017). 
As Asiyanbi (2017: 1) writes, however, while ‘material processes appear thin, sluggish, 
fractured, hybridised or stalled in practice’, the emergent and expanding green projects 
outlined above can simultaneously be understood as ‘durable processes of becoming’ and as 
consolidating, rather than retreating, ‘markets-in-the-making’. Indeed, several of the examples 
shared here illustrate a keen appetite in ensuring success in this new edge in conservation 
finance on the part of their architects in public financial institutions, private intermediary 
organisations and ‘on-the-ground’ suppliers of carbon and ecosystem value. This appetite is 
demonstrated by new seed investments, new alliances between intermediaries that may assist 
with scaling up investment portfolios, and consolidated policy support at national and 
international levels. All these dimensions are ‘organising actions’ exhibiting a neoliberal 
tendency towards the ‘truth regime of the market’ (Foucault 2008(1979) wherein 
interventions in environmental management are rendered increasingly intelligible to market 
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and financial logics (Sullivan 2013a; also Asiyanbi 2017: 5). 
At the same time, financialisation can be thought of in multiple ways that are not about 
financial flows only (for example, Sullivan 2013a; Chiapello and Godefroy 2017). 
Financialisation of course is about volumes and directions of money that both move and 
accumulate via financial instruments and investments. But it is also about making and valuing 
new aspects of the world in the image of finance through the creation of newly (ac)countable 
asset classes that perhaps close off and devalue other(ed) and prior ways of knowing social 
and natural worlds. It is about creating opportunities and communities aligned around the fizz 
of potential and promise as new asset classes are fabricated in the world. It is about framing 
and taming social and natural worlds as (pump)primed for (ac)counting, acquisition and 
accumulation, as occurs in the creation of all speculative investment bubbles in which there is 
money to be made precisely because such opportunities may be unsustainable.  
This chapter has traced some ways in which places and spaces reframed and revalued as asset 
classes are becoming further incorporated into financial(ised) value-frames, as testified by the 
brokers, intermediaries and investments funds for conservation finance outlined above. It is 
too soon to see the extent to which these proposals, policies and products will take hold, how 
much money will thereby flow either towards conservation investments or towards investors, 
or what conservation impacts may manifest in the long term and with what social effects. This 
is an edge that is moving fast, but it is also an edge animated by the promise of financial(ised) 
returns of value and the sustenance of capital(ist) political economic structures. These 
structures tend to distribute income unequally, pulling towards accumulation, speculation and 
inequity. In II for conservation finance, they may additionally intensify processes whereby 
standing natural capitals in southern countries become bound to outside investors in ways that 
may influence sovereignty over those resources, as well as increasing the indebtedness of the 
thus-invested contexts. Importantly, then, if these public–private investments in public social 
and environmental spheres are to elicit significant public understanding and confidence they 
will require impact measures, data tables and reporting to be publicly available for review and 
debate. This is an edge ripe for detailed empirical, comparative and independent case research 
especially to clarify evidence for positive social and/or environmental impacts for those for 
whom tropical ecosystems are home.  
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